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Abstract
This article is a follow-up of a short essay that appeared in Nature
455 1181 (2008). It has become increasingly clear that the erratic dy-
namics of markets is mostly endogenous and not due to the rational
processing of exogenous news. I elaborate on the idea that spin-glass
type of problems, where the combination of competition and hetero-
geneities generically leads to long epochs of statis interrupted by crises
and hyper-sensitivity to small changes of the environment, could be
metaphors for the complexity of economic systems. I argue that the
most valuable contribution of physics to economics might end up be-
ing of methodological nature, and that simple models from physics
and agent based numerical simulations, although highly stylized, are
more realistic than the traditional models of economics that assume
rational agents with infinite foresight and infinite computing abilities.
The current direful crisis puts classical economics thinking under huge
pressure. In theory, deregulated markets should be efficient, rational agents
quickly correct any mispricing or forecasting error. Price faithfully reflect
the underlying reality and ensure optimal allocation of resources. These
“equilibrated” markets should be stable: crises can only be triggered by
acute exogeneous disturbances, such as hurricanes, earthquakes or political
upheavals, but certainly not precipitated by the market itself. This is in stark
contrast with most financial crashes, including the latest one. The theory
of economic equilibrium and rational expectations, as formalized since the
50’s and 60’s, has deeply influenced scores of decision-makers high up in
government agencies and financial institutions. Some of them are now “in
a state of shocked disbelief”, as Alan Greenspan himself declared when he
∗Science & Finance, Capital Fund Management, 6 Bd Haussmann, 75009 Paris, France
1
recently admitted that he had put too much faith in the self-correcting power
of free markets and had failed to anticipate the self-destructive power of
wanton mortgage lending. Economic theories turn out to have significant
impact on our every-day life. The last twenty years of deregulation have
been prompted by the argument that constraints of all kinds prevent the
markets from reaching their supposedly perfect equilibrium, efficient state.
The theory of Rational Expectations has now permeated into International
Political Economics, Sociology, Law, etc.1
Unfortunately, nothing is more dangerous than dogmas donned with sci-
entific feathers. The present crisis might offer an excellent occasion for a
paradigm change, already called for in the past by yawing economists such
as John Maynard Keynes, Alan Kirman or Steve Keen. They have forcefully
highlighted the shortcomings and contradictions of classical economics, but
progress has been slow. Of course, it is all easier said than done, and the task
looks so formidable that some economists argue that it is better to stick with
the implausible but well corseted theory of perfectly rational agents rather
than to venture into modelling the infinite number of ways agents can be
irrational. So where should one start? What should be taught to students in
order to foster, on the long run, a better grasp of the complexity of economic
systems? Can physics really contribute to the much awaited paradigm shift?
After twenty years or so of “econophysics”2 and around 1000 papers in the
arXiv, it is perhaps useful to give a personal birds eye view of what has been
achieved in that direction.
Econophysics is in fact, at this moment in time, a misnomer since most
of its scope concerns financial markets. To some economists, finance is of
relatively minor importance and any contribution, even significant, can only
have a limited impact on economics at large. I personally strongly disagree
with this viewpoint: the recent events confirm that financial markets hic-
cups can cripple the entire economy. From a more conceptual point of view,
financial markets represent an ideal laboratory for testing several fundamen-
tal concepts of economics, for example: Is the price really such that supply
matches demand? Or: Are price moves primarily due to news? The terabytes
of data spitted out everyday by financial markets allows one (in fact compels
one) to compare in detail theories with observations and the answers to both
questions above seem to be clear no’s.3
1There are rational expectation theories of marriage, drug addiction or obesity!
2It seems adequate to define the first econophysics event as the Santa Fe conference in
1987, although the first scientific papers were written in the mid nineties, and the name
econophysics coined by Gene Stanley in 1995.
3On these points, see Joulin et al. (2008) for the minor role news seem to play in
explaining large price jumps, and Bouchaud et al. (2008) for an extensive review on the
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This proliferation of data should soon concern other spheres of economics
and social science: credit cards and e-commerce will allow one to monitor
consumption in real time and to test theories of consumer behaviour in great
detail. 4 So we must get prepared to deal with huge amounts of data, and
to learn to scrutinize them with as little prejudice as possible, still asking
relevant questions, starting from the most obvious ones – those that need
nearly no statistical test at all because the answers are clear to the naked
eye – and only then delving into more sophisticated ones. The very choice
of the relevant questions is often sheer serendipity: more of an art than a
science. That intuition, it seems to me, is well nurtured by an education in
natural sciences, where the emphasis is put on mechanisms and analogies,
rather than on axioms and theorem proving.
Faced with a mess of facts to explain, Feynman advocated that one should
choose one of them and try one’s best to understand it in depth, with the
hope that the emerging theory is powerful enough to explain many more ob-
servations. In the case of financial markets, physicists have been immediately
intrigued by a number of phenomena described by power-laws. For example,
the distribution of price changes, of company sizes, of individual wealth all
have a power-law tail, to a large extent universal. The activity and volatility
of markets have a power-law correlation in time, reflecting their intermittent
nature, obvious to the naked eye: quiescent periods are intertwined with
bursts of activity, on all time scales. Power-laws leave most economists un-
ruffled (isn’t it, after all, just another fitting function?), but immediately send
physicists imagination churning. The reason is that many complex physical
systems display very similar intermittent dynamics: velocity fluctuations in
turbulent flows, avalanche dynamics in random magnets under a slowly vary-
ing external field, teetering progression of cracks in a slowly strained disor-
dered material, etc. The interesting point about these examples is that while
the exogeneous driving force is regular and steady, the resulting endogenous
dynamics is complex and jittery. In these cases, the non-trivial (physicists
say critical) nature of the dynamics comes from collective effects: individual
components have a relatively simple behaviour, but interactions lead to new,
emergent phenomena. The whole is fundamentally different from any of its
elementary sub-part. Since this intermittent behaviour appears to be generic
for physical systems with both heterogeneities and interaction, it is tempt-
ing to think that the dynamics of financial markets, and more generally of
economic systems, does reflect the same underlying mechanisms.
inadequacy of the idea that supply and demand is cleared instantaneously in financial
markets.
4For an interesting work in that direction, see Sornette et al (2004).
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Several economically inspired models have been shown to exhibit these
critical features. One is a transposition of the Random Field Ising Model
(RFIM) to describe situations where there is a conflict between personal
opinions, public information and social pressure.5 Imagine a collection of
traders having all different a priori opinions, say optimistic (buy) or pes-
simistic (sell). Traders are influenced by some slowly varying global factors,
for example interest rates, inflation, earnings, dividend forecasts, etc. One
assumes no shocks whatsoever in the dynamics of these exogenous factors,
but posits that each trader is also influenced by the opinion of the major-
ity. He conforms to it if the strength of his a priori opinion is weaker than
his herding tendency. If all agents made their mind in isolation (zero herd-
ing tendency) then the aggregate opinion would faithfully track the external
influences and, by assumption, evolve smoothly. But surprisingly, if the
herding tendency exceeds some finite threshold, the evolution of the aggre-
gate opinion jumps discontinuously from optimistic to pessimistic as global
factors only deteriorate slowly and smoothly. Furthermore, some hysteresis
appears. Much as supersaturated vapor refusing to turn into liquid, opti-
mism is self-consistently maintained. In order to trigger the crach, global
factors have to degrade far beyond the point where pessimism should pre-
vail. On the way back, these factors must improve much beyond the crash
tipping point for global optimism to be reinstalled, again somewhat abruptly.
Although the model is highly simplified, it is hard not to see some resem-
blance with all bubbles in financial history. The progressive reckoning of the
amount of leverage used by banks to pile up bad debt should have led to a
self-correcting, soft landing of global markets – as the efficient market theory
would predict. Instead, collective euphoria screens out all bad omens until
it becomes totally unsustainable. Any small, anecdotal event or insignificant
news is then enough to spark the meltdown.
The above framework also illustrates in a vivid way the breakdown of a
cornerstone of classical economics, stigmatized in Alan Kirman’s essayWhom
or what does the representative individual represent? Much as in statistical
physics or material science, one of the main theoretical challenges in eco-
nomics is the micro/macro link. How does one infer the aggregate behaviour
(for example the aggregate demand) from the behaviour of individual ele-
ments? The representative agent theory amounts to replacing an ensemble
of heterogeneous and interacting agents by a unique representative one – but
in the RFIM, this is just impossible: the behaviour of the crowd is funda-
5See Sethna et al. (2001) for a general review on this model, and Galam & Moscovici
(1991) and Michard & Bouchaud (2005) for some application to economics and social
science.
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mentally different from that of any single individual.
Minority Games define another, much richer, family of models in which
agents learn to compete for scarce resources. 6 A crucial aspect here is that
the decisions of these agents impact the market: the price does not evolve
exogenously but moves as a result of these decisions. A remarkable result
is the existence, within this framework, of a genuine phase transition as the
number of speculators increase, between a predictable market where agents
can eke out some profit from their strategies, and an over-crowded market,
where these profits vanish or become too risky. Around the critical point
where predictability disappears and efficiency sets in, intermittent power-
law phenomena emerge, akin to those observed on real stock markets. The
cute point of this analysis is that there is a well-grounded mechanism to
keep the market in the vicinity of the critical point:7 less agents means more
profit opportunities which attracts more agents, more agents means no profit
opportunities so that frustrated agents leave the market.
There are other examples in physics and computer science where com-
petition and heterogeneities lead to interesting phenomena which could be
metaphors of the complexity of economic systems: spin-glasses (within which
spins interact randomly with one another), molecular glasses, protein folding,
Boolean satisfiability problems, etc. In these problems, the energy (or the
cost function) that must be minimized is an incredibly complicated function
of the N degrees of freedoms (the spins, the position of the atoms of the
protein, the Boolean variables). Generically, this function is found to display
an exponential number (in N) of local minima. The absolute best one is (a)
extremely hard to find: the best algorithms to find it take an exponential
time in N; (b) only marginally better than the next best one; (c) extremely
fragile to a change of the parameters of the problem: the best one can easily
swap over to become the second best, or even cease abruptly to be a mini-
mum. Physical systems with these “rugged” energy landscapes display very
characteristic phenomena, extensively studied in the last twenty years, both
experimentally and theoretically.8 The dynamics is extremely slow as the
system is lost amidst all these local minima; equilibrium is never reached in
practice; there is intermittent sensitivity to small changes of the environment.
There is no reason to believe that the dynamics of economic systems, also
governed by competition and heterogeneities, should behave very differently
6For a review and references, see Challet, Marsily and Zhang (2005).
7A mechanism called Self-Organized Criticality by Per Bak (1996), which is assumed
to take place in other situations potentially relevant to economics, for example evolution
and extinction of species, which might have the evolution and extinction of companies.
8For a review see A. P. Young (1998)
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– at least beyond a certain level of complexity and interdependency.9
If true, this would entail a major change of paradigm:
• First, even if an equilibrium state exists in theory it may be totally
irrelevant in practice, because the equilibration time is far too long. As
Keynes noted, in the long run we are all dead. The convergence to the
Eden Garden of economic systems might not be hobbled by regulations
but by their tug-induced complexity. One can in fact imagine situations
where regulation could nudge free, competitive markets closer to an
efficient state, which they would never reach otherwise.
• Second, complex economic systems should be inherently fragile to small
perturbations, and generically evolve in an intermittent way, with a
succession of rather stable epochs punctuated by rapid, unpredictable
changes – again, even when the exogenous drive is smooth and steady.
No big news is needed to make markets lurch wildly, in agreement
with recent empirical observations (see Joulin et al. 2008). Within
this metaphor of markets, competition and complexity could be the
essential cause of their endogenous instability.10
The above models tell interesting stories but are clearly highly stylized
and aim to be inspiring rather than convincing. Still, they seem quite a
bit more realistic than the traditional models of economics that assume ra-
tional agents with infinite foresight and infinite computing abilities. Such
simplifying caricatures are often made for the sake of analytical tractability,
but many of the above results can in fact be established analytically, using
statistical mechanics tools developed in the last thirty years to deal with
disordered systems. One of the most remarkable breakthroughs is the cor-
rect formulation of a mean-field approximation to deal with interactions in
heterogeneous systems. Whereas the simple Curie-Weiss mean-field approx-
imation for homogenous systems is well known and accounts for interesting
collective effects11, its heterogeneous counterpart is far subtler and has only
been worked out in detail in the last few years.12 It is a safe bet to pre-
9The idea that spin-glass theory might be relevant to economics was originally suggested
by Phil Anderson during the Santa Fe meeting The economy as a complex evolving system
(1988).
10In a recent beautiful paper, Marsili (2008) has shown how the increase of derivative
products could drive the system close to an instability point, using concepts and methods
quite similar to those of the Minority Game.
11The Curie-Weiss mean field theory was first used in an economic context by Brock
and Durlauf (2001).
12For a thorough review, see Me´zard & Montanari (2009).
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dict that this powerful analytical tool will find many natural application in
economics and social sciences in the years to come.
As models become more realistic and hone in on details, analytics often
has to give way to numerical simulations. The situation is now well accepted
in physics, where numerical experimentation has gained a respectable status,
bestowing us with a telescope of the mind, (as beautifully coined by Mark
Buchanan) multiplying human powers of analysis and insight just as a tele-
scope does our powers of vision. Sadly, many economists are still reluctant
to recognize that numerical investigation of a model, although very far from
theorem proving, is a valid way to do science. Yet, it is a useful compass to
venture into the wilderness of irrational agent models: try this behavioural
rule and see what comes out, explore another assumption, iterate, explore.
It is actually surprising how easily these numerical experiments allow one to
qualify an agent-based model as potentially realistic (and then one should
dwell further) or completely off the mark.13 What makes this expeditious di-
agnosis possible is the fact that for large systems details do not matter much
– only a few microscopic features end up surviving at the macro scale. This
is a well-known story in physics: the structure of the Navier-Stokes equation
for macroscopic fluid flow, for example, is independent of all molecular de-
tails. The present research agenda is therefore to identify the features that
explain financial markets and economic systems as we know them. This is of
course still very much of an open problem, and simulations will play a central
role. The main bet of econophysics is that competition and heterogeneity, as
described above, should be the marrow ingredients of the final theory.
A slew of other empirical results, useful analytical methods and numerical
tricks have been established in the 15 active years of econophysics, which
I have no space to review here.14 But in my opinion the most valuable
contribution of physics to economics will end up being of methodological
nature. Physics has its own way to construct models of reality based on a
subtle mixture of intuition, analogies and mathematical spin, where the ill-
defined concept of plausibility can be more relevant than the accuracy of the
prediction. Kepler’s ellipses and Newton’s gravitation were more plausible
than Ptolemy’s epicycles, even when the latter theory, after centuries of fixes
and stitches, was initially more accurate to describe observations. When Phil
Anderson first heard about the theory of Rational Expectations in the famous
1987 Santa Fe meeting, his befuddled reaction was: You guys really believe
13For reviews, see Goldberg & Janssen (2005) and Lux (2008).
14 Let me quote in particular models of wealth distribution, market microstructure and
impact of trades, exactly solvable stochastic volatility models, path integrals, multifractal
random walks or random matrix theory. For more exhaustive reviews, see (among others):
Bouchaud & Potters (2004), Yakovenko (2007), Lux (2008).
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that? He would probably have fallen from his chair had he heard Milton
Friedman’s complacent viewpoint on theoretical economics: In general, the
more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions. Physicists
definitely want to know what an equation means in intuitive terms, and
believe that assumptions ought to be both plausible and compatible with
observations. This is probably the most urgently needed paradigm shift in
economics.
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